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When mass protests and regime changes swept across North Africa in the Spring of 
2011, and subsequently triggered turbulence in Bahrain and a bloody civil war 
presently being waged in Syria, Occidental journalism and political commentary was 
initially taken by surprise. The status quo – and not only for Arab dictators – had 
seemingly crumbled overnight. The situation was eventually brought into perspective 
and under Western eyes through a series of explanatory frames – educated 
unemployed youth, the new social media, state oppression and the lack of democracy 
– that responded to Occidental criteria of analysis. Of course, in the contemporary 
conditions of planetary modernity all is somehow connected, nothing takes place in a 
vacuum, and the languages, technologies and ideologies of the West clearly played a 
significant role. However, rather than measure such events – their perceived 
achievements and failures – against a presumed Occidental template it is perhaps 
politically and historically more significant to register the emergence of a series of 
interrogations that invest both the protagonists and those of us observing from afar. It 
is also important at this point to register that the processes and procedures under 
discussion are still very much in progress: the question of rights and liberties – social, 
political, human – remain open, the subject of discussion, debate and continuing 
struggle. A previous political landscape, which had been thoroughly endorsed by 
Western powers and diplomacy, is clearly in ruins. The assumption that only the 
Occidental ‘we’ has the right to define ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ has clearly been 
rendered vulnerable to unsuspected historical operations and cultural forces. 
What emerge from this picture are critical prospects that criss-cross the 
Mediterranean, rendering proximate its northern and southern shores, shredding the 
confines between Occident and Orient. When the terms of political, historical and 
cultural freedom are exposed – for whom, where, when and how? – a whole critical 
lexicon comes under review. The assumed temporality of political and historical 
progress, the accumulative power of its linear development, is skewed into another 
space in which modernity is neither mono-dimensional nor homogeneous. The 
downfall of Mubarak, the daily protests in Tahrir Square, were not simply Egyptian 
matters. Their resonance was not restricted merely to the Arab world. A political 
lexicon that many consider to be complete and fully achieved in the governing bodies 
and institutional authorities of the West has been reopened and newly researched, 
traversed and translated. Understandings of the individual, the public sphere, political 
agency, religion, secularism and the state, suddenly become vulnerable to 
renegotiation in events that rudely punctuate flawless abstractions. 
As we, too, are learning, nothing is guaranteed. Rights and freedoms can be rolled 
back. In the name of security, driven by the imperatives of governance, there can 
always occur a turn in the screw. In a world that increasingly does not recognise 
human beings, only citizens and subjects, the categories that supposedly secure the 
polis are always open to unsuspected interpretation, redefinition, contestation and 
ideological spin. Our conceptual securities become the agonistic sites of historical 
processes and cultural struggle that do not necessarily mirror the critical and political 
imperatives of the West. What is presently occurring in North Africa and the eastern 
Mediterranean – in Egypt, Israel or Syria – throws an interrogating light across the 
West that in multiple ways is responsible for the powers and possibilities in play. Not 
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only does a colonial past, etched in the actual frontiers of these states and, in 
particular, in the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948, continue to haunt the 
dramatic conflictuality of the area, but understandings are overwhelmingly directed 
and disciplined by Western constructions of Islam and the Arab world. In an 
unfortunately under-read book by Edward Said – Covering Islam: How the Media and 
the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (1981) – the precise 
political and cultural prison house of such constructions is caught in its brutal 
historical weight. Precisely by slipping beyond these constructions and reworking and 
translating the political and cultural lexicons of modernity the West is now confronted 
by a modernity that is not merely ‘ours’ to administer and define. In the transit of 
translation, which as Walter Benjamin has taught us is always a two-way process in 
which the original is subsequently impossible to reconstruct, unexpected versions 
emerge. As Salman Rushdie put it some time ago, this is how newness enters the 
world.1 
After all, explanations that run along the grooves of precarious livelihoods, youth 
unemployment and the frequent unaccountability of government are an increasingly 
global condition and not simply restricted to the south of the planet. Revolts in Tunis 
and rioting in south London are not the same thing. They are differentiated in all 
manner of complexities, but they are also bound together in the overarching 
procedures of a neo-liberal global order. Here in the resonance and dissonance of 
different localities we also touch the paradoxes of the present conjuncture: registering 
in the Arab world demands for freedom, change and accountable government, while 
in the West these perspectives are often publicly in retreat. To register the proximity 
of the dramatic visual presence of events unfolding on the African and Asian shores 
of the Mediterranean draws the West, however reluctantly, out of its self. Massacres, 
dictatorships, police brutality, people on the street voicing the sacred lexicon of 
Western liberalism – ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’ – cannot be ignored. There was no 
burning of US or European or Israeli flags; simply the disquieting spectacle of people 
apparently taking the political rhetoric of the West seriously; often far more seriously 
than the West itself. The languages of the West have exceeded any single point of 
‘origin’; they are clearly no longer its property, to be defined and managed solely 
according to its will. 
What is exposed, perhaps unwinding in what until yesterday were the autocratic 
states of North Africa, is a profound challenge to neo-liberalism, to its individualist 
and fundamentally anti-social and anti-democratic logic. Beyond the slogans of 
democracy and constitutional reform there is emerging in the Arab world the 
fundamental contestation of the hypocrisy of the modern state, particularly after the 
fiscal crash of 2008, which considers only the welfare of its elites throughout the 
world, rather than that of the majority of its population. There are significant 
planetary communalities here. The public financing of stability and not of change, the 
rescue of banks and the bailing out of corruption rather than people, is part of 
planetary drive towards privatising profits and socialising losses. Ultimately, the on-
going struggles for change in the Arab world, the unexpected outcomes of a social 
networking that stretches from the blogosphere to the street, is also profoundly about 
processes of democratisation and their absence, not only in the rest of the world, but 
also in the West itself. The necessary re-reading of modernity proposed in the present 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Salman Rushdie, ‘In Good Faith’, in Salman Rushdie Imaginary Homelands, Granta, London, 1992, 
p.394. This theme is brilliantly explored in Homi Bhabha’s essay ‘How newness enters the world’, in 
H.K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, Routledge, London and New York, 1994.	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moment invites us to consider in particular its composition in the complex meshing of 
liberalism and capitalism. This is a political economy – the very term and practice 
itself a product of this formation – in which Occidental economical, political and 
cultural power presents itself as a hegemonic force on a planetary scale. It is where 
state, nation, market and ‘civilisation’ are increasingly wedged or striated within each 
other’s making, and their separation increasingly rendered untenable. It is about a 
‘way of life’. This is why we are talking about a political economy and not simply 
about economics. 
Abu Atris, the pseudonym of a writer working in Egypt, suggested on the Al 
Jazeera English web site (24/02/2011) that what was under way in the revolts in North 
Africa was also a revolt against neo-liberalism and the policing of its logic by 
subordinate client states in the Arab world. The systematic conflation of business and 
politics under the impact of privatisation, forcibly bringing society under the rule of 
the market, is not only typical of the situation in ‘advanced Western democracies’. 
Egypt and Tunisia have been neoliberal states for decades. The proximity of Arab 
leadership to the Bush administrations, or over a longer period of time of the direct 
involvement of the Italian government in the Tunisian state, is mirrored in public 
figures (which in Egypt includes the upper ranks of the military) having a foot in both 
politics and business. Government is there to defend free market fundamentalism, to 
divert financing from the public to the private sector, or rather to privatise and plunder 
public resources, and to ideologically block considerations of poverty and questions 
of social and economical justice. In this scenario, the proximity of Cairo to 
Washington, or of Tripoli to Rome, reaches its obscene extremes when warfare comes 
to be organised through neo-liberal principles and increasingly privatised: contractors 
in Iraq, mercenaries in Libya. 
For the problem, rarely acknowledged, is that there does not exist a unique or 
homogenous West, or East, there exists no such thing as Islam or Christianity. The 
world cannot be othered in such simplicities, and civilisation or truth be immediately 
identified with one or other of the antagonistic poles. To insist on the idea of Islam as 
a thing, condensed in the figure of the armed terrorist or the veiled woman, that is, in 
a clear image to be confronted, contested and eventually converted to our way of life, 
reveals, as Edward Said and Gil Anidjar have explained, the centrality of religious 
discourse to the making of the modern West. As a category of interpretation – like 
‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ — the concept of ‘religion’ is an invention of Occidental 
modernity and its planetary pedagogy. 
 
El Jadida. It is the hour that milk is delivered. The hour that I love the most in 
my city, peopled still only for an instance by those who have to rise early: 
street cleaners, fisherman, donut vendors, the devout, vegetable sellers, the 
custodians of the public ovens. One after another they wish me a «luminous 
day» while I wander the streets and alleys. Come with me into the old 
Portuguese town where the past has been restored in the smallest detail. In this 
space, the size of a public square, there, flanking each other is a mosque, a 
church and a synagogue. What is this Islamism? This word does not appear in 
our dictionaries. I learnt of its existence in the Western media.2 
      Driss Chraibi, ‘Extreme West’ 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Driss Chraibi, ‘Occidente estremo’ in Micaela Arcidiacona and Erminio Risso (eds), Voci del 
Mediterraneo, Edizioni Magma, Naples, 1997. My translation. 	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The disquieting historical conclusion, that we rarely confront, is that European 
Christianity is perhaps the proper name of Occidental modernity and its globalisation. 
Secular, lay thought, is sustained by a disposition of faith: the belief in the 
teleological redemption of time as ‘progress’; in the call to save the world and render 
it subservient to an unique image; in the humanist mastery of the cosmos; in the 
mission to create an exceptional state, or the ‘city on the hill’, sought by the Puritans 
in the colonies of north America (and the Jesuits thousand of miles further south on 
the same continent). As Antonio Gramsci reminds us, the relationship between 
religion, the state and the political formation of the West is inseparable. Elsewhere, I 
have argued that the secular West is sustained by this ‘invisible order’.3 In strictly 
historical terms no one would contest this affirmation, particularly in the context of 
the violent affirmation of the constellation of European colonialism. But to insist 
today on this dimension frequently promotes critical embarrassment and silence. 
Today, the question of religion is associated with other places, and other epochs, with 
another culture: somebody else’s property and problem, certainly not belonging to our 
modern world. Some years ago, the Egyptian scholar Leila Ahmed noted that in the 
struggle of Western women for their rights and freedom no one ever suggested that 
they should abandon Christianity in order to obtain them. Today, it is precisely this 
option – the abandonment of what, after all, is a variant of a shared monotheism  – 
which the West demands of Muslim women.4 Such a request obviously presumes that 
Islam and modernity are separate entitles, rather than profoundly entangled in a 
complex European and extra-European formation. That one can be modern, a Muslim 
and a woman clearly undoes any singular definition of modernity, its politics, 
practices and possibilities.5  
From this awareness it becomes possible to grasp the sense of an eventual 
humanism that is disentangled from the hypocrisy of a ‘Europe which never stops 
talking of man yet massacres him at every one of its street corners, at every corner of 
the world.’ (235) The humanism that Fanon sought, to replace a ‘jumble of dead 
words’ (p.11), has the vital responsibility to host requests and desires that exceed the 
will of the West. To cross this threshold is to sound the intellectual and moral 
bankruptcy of a Europe that achieved its apex in the colonial instance that, in turn, 
was stabilised and perpetuated by racism as a founding structure of Occidental 
modernity. Here there would be much to say on the vicinity of Fanon and Foucault 
around the central idea of race and racism as the central disposition of modern bio-
power. 
 
Apart from secularism, the other key concept invariably deployed in the registration 
of apparent difference between Europe and the rest of the world is that of the ‘public 
sphere’. Together with secularism, the public sphere is considered central to the 
formation and exercise of modern democracy. Here in the public exposition of 
individualism and rationalised interests the modern bourgeois order was apparently 
formed.6 It tends to be assumed that the rest of the world lives the concept of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Iain Chambers, ‘The “Unseen Order”. Religion, Secularism and Hegemony’, in Neelam Srivastava 
and Baidik Bhattacharya (eds)  The Postcolonial Gramsci, Routledge, London, 2012. 4	  Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1993.	  5	  Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 2005.	  
6 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, Polity Press, Oxford, 1992. 
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public sphere as an absence, rather than being the site of other modalities of public 
encounter, confrontation and expression.7 The opacity proposed by embedded 
practices and lives elsewhere confound Occidental rationality seeking to render the 
world transparent to the universalising desire of its will. If modern anthropology has 
begun to understand this, much of the rest of the social and human sciences still 
remain very much in the dark. The so-called ‘Arab Spring’, unauthorised by Western 
politics, culture and its sciences, has operated a cut of this type. What emerges is that 
the Occidental blueprint cannot be simply copied or imposed. Its languages and 
technologies may well open up local counter-spaces and narratives – from rap music, 
heavy metal Islam and social networks to pressuring political institutions to change  – 
but they are always in transit, without guarantees; their apparent roots in the West 
provide somebody else's routes. The West in becoming the world loses its ‘origins’.  
The question of secularism and the public sphere should therefore not be 
understood simply in terms of their sociological specificity: the historical products of 
local forces, political desires and cultural constraints. As cultural practices and 
historical forces they contribute to an altogether more extensive debate, and the 
eventual elaboration of a convivial critical space that is neither limited to Islam, the 
Arab world, nor to the West. The translation by the West of its other, and that of the 
West by the other, however asymmetrical the relationship, is by no means a one-way 
traffic. This is why the planetary transit of the West – its political languages, 
technologies and modalities of knowledge – poses a far more significant perspective 
than that of mimicry, mistranslation and presumed ‘betrayals’. In this sense the daily 
practices of realising political processes able to negotiate and configure the historical 
and cultural conditions of life in North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean pose a 
series of interrogations that arrive at the heart of the global pretensions of democratic 
thought. The assumption that democracy is forever Occidental in provenance, practice 
and participation necessarily comes undone. If the West has become the world it can 
no longer claim a unique centre or single authority.  
As the infinite passage of music teaches us, the discourse and structures of 
democracy, faith and the public sphere can be duplicated, dubbed and remixed in 
multiple and unauthorised versions. The encounter with other historical traditions, 
cultural patrimonies and modalities of reasoning instigates mutual translation 
(however uneven the forces in play). It inaugurates processes that can no longer be 
understood in a unilateral fashion. ‘Freedom’ and ‘democracy’ are not exportable 
items, ‘religion’ is not merely a timeless dogma: all are historical practices that 
emerge from complex human fashioning. Learning from a multifarious world that has 
not simply been proximate in its thought and culture to the West, but also deeply 
imbricated in its formation and language (from science and medicine to language, 
literature and the culinary arts), is not merely a matter of adjusting a repressed 
historical archive. Listening and responding to the southern and eastern shores of the 
present-day Mediterranean is, despite its obvious economic and political 
subordination to Euro-American interests, to take an apprenticeship in the justice of a 
democracy yet to come: both there and here. 
This, finally, is the ‘disjunctive time’ (Homi Bhabha) of the postcolonial present. It 
is a time that is neither linear nor monolithic, and exposes modernity to other 
dynamics in the planetary present.8 It is right now being explored in events, cultural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Armando Salvatore, ‘Eccentric Modernity? An Islamic Perspective on the Civilizing Process and the 
Public Sphere.’ European Journal of Social Theory, 14, 1, 2011. 8	  Sandro Mezzadra and Federico Rahola, ‘The Postcolonial Condition: A few Notes on the Quality of 
Historical Time in the Global Present’, Postcolonial Text, vol.2, n.1, 2006.	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practices and political struggles from Tunis to Teheran. This is a time that is divided 
from a unique temporality and is always out of joint with respect to a singular will. As 
a temporality that is folded into the uneven specificities of place, and their particular 
powers of transformation, it promotes the emerging critique of the assumed 
‘neutrality’ of the Occidental view: its political framing, its historical verdicts and the 
knowledge apparatuses of its social sciences. Political, sociological and historical 
knowledge – their ‘objectivity’ – is now rendered accountable in another, unsuspected 
critical space: all to be renegotiated in a displaced positionality. 
In underscoring how we are diversely placed, and yet ultimately connected, these 
comments have simply sought to propose a modality of criticism that is ultimately 
willing to expose itself to a Mediterranean whose histories, cultures and possibilities 
are irreducible to the presumed authority of its northern shore. Is this what we might 
mean by a postcolonial Mediterranean? Perhaps, it is certainly a proposal for a new, 
more open, multilateral critical space. 
 
